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Abstrat. The following four classes of computational problems are equivalent:
solving matrix games,
solving linear programs,
best l∞ linear approximation,
best l1 linear approximation.
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Definitions
First we recall relevent definitions.
An affine function of variables x1, . . . , xn is b0 + c1x1 + · · · + cnxn where b0, ci are
given numbers.
An l∞ linear approximation problem, also known as (discrete) Chebyshev approxima-
tion problem is the problem of minimization of the following function:
max(|f1|, . . . , |fm|) = ‖(f1, . . . , fm)‖∞, (1)
where f1, . . . , fm are m affine functions of n variables. This objective function is piece-wise
linear and convex.
An l1 linear approximation problem, also known as finding the LAD (least-absolute-
deviations) fit, is the problem of minimization of the following function:
m∑
i=1
|fi| = ‖(f1, . . . , fm)‖1, (2)
where f1, . . . , fm are m affine functions of n variables. This objective function is piece-wise
linear and convex.
A matrix game is given by a (payoff) matrix A. To solve a matrix game is to find a
row p (an optimal strategy for the row player), a column q (an optimal strategy for the
column player), and a number v such that p = (pi) ≥ 0,
∑
pi = 1, q = (qj) ≥ 0,
∑
qi =
1, pA ≥ v ≥ Aq. The number v is known as the value of game. The pair (p, q) is known as
an equilibrium for the matrix game.
As usual, x ≥ 0 means that every entry of the vector x is ≥ 0. We write y ≤ t for a
vector y and a number t if every entry of y is ≤ t. We go even further in abusing notation,
denoting by y− t the vector obtaining from y by subtracting t from every entry. Similarly
we denote by M + c the matrix obtained from M by adding a number c to every entry.
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A matrix game is called symmetric if the payoff matrix is skew-symmetric. Recall
that the value of any symmetric game is 0, and the transposition gives a bijection between
the optimal strategies of the players.
A linear constraint is any of the following constraints: f ≤ g, f ≥ g, f = g, where f, g
are affine functions. A linear program is an optimization (maximization or minimization)
of an affine function subject to a finite system of linear constraints.
Statement of results
It is well known, that solving a matrix game can be reduced to solving a pair of linear
programs, dual to each other. It is also known that solving any linear program can be
reduced to finding an optimal strategy with positive last component for a symmetric matrix
game. In both reductions, the size of data (in terms of the number of given numbers or
the number of given bits) may increase at most two times.
A subtle point here is: how can we compute an optimal strategy (for a symmetric
game) with a positive last entry or prove that no such strategy exists? An answer is that
for any vertex in the set of optimal strategy with positive last entry is a solution of a
system of linear equations whose coefficients are the entries of the payoff matrix or 0,1, so
a positive lower bound α can be given for this entry (at least in the case when all given
numbers are rational). Namely, let β be an upper bound for the absolute values of the
numerators and denominators of the entries of the payoff matrix of size N by N. Then
α = β−2NN−N/2 will work. Notice that 0 < α < 1.
The mixed strategies for the column player with the last entry ≥ α in the symmetric
game are the mixed strategies for the column player for the modified game obtained by
adding the (α/(1 − α))-multiple of the last column to the other columns of the payoff
matrix. The optimal strategies for a modified matrix game give optimal strategies with
positive last entry for the original symmetric game provided that the value of the modified
game stays 0 (otherwise, there are no optimal strategies with positive last entry for the
original symmetric game hence the original linear program has no optimal solutions).
Given any l∞ approximation problem with the objective function (1), here is a well-
known reduction (Vaserstein, 2003) to a linear program with one additional variable t:
t→ min, subject to − t ≤ fi ≤ t for i = 1, . . . , m.
This is a linear program with n + 1 variables and 2m linear constraints. Since any lin-
ear program can be reduced to a matrix game (see above), we conclude that finding an
Chebyshev fit can be reduced to solving a matrix game.
The converse reduction is a main goal of this paper:
Theorem 1. Solving any matrix game can be reduced to finding a Chebyshev fit.
More precisely, when the game is given by an m by n matrix, we construct a Cheby-
shev approximation problem with 2m + 2n + 3 affine functions of m + n + 1 variables as
well as a bijection between the equilibria for the matrix game and the solutions for the
approximation problem.
Given any l1 approximation problem with the objective function (2), here is a well-
known reduction (Vaserstein, 2003) to a linear program with m additional variables ti:
m∑
i=1
ti → min, subject to − ti ≤ fi ≤ ti for i = 1, . . . , m.
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This is a linear program with n+m variables and 2m linear constraints. Since any linear
program can be reduced to a matrix game (see above), we conclude that finding the best
l1-fit can be reduced to solving a matrix game.
The converse reduction is the second goal of this paper:
Theorem 2. Solving any matrix game can be reduced to solving an l1 linear ap-
proximation problem. More precisely, when the game is given by an m by n matrix, we
construct an l1 approximation problem with 4m + 4n + 6 affine functions of m + n + 1
variables as well as a bijection between the equilibria for the matrix game and the solutions
for the approximation problem.
Proof of Theorem 1
Consider any matrix game with the payoff matrix A with m rows and n columns. It
can can be reduced to the symmetric game with the payoff matrix
M =


0 A+ C −J
−AT − C 0 J ′
JT −J ′ 0

 ,
where J (rest. J ′) is the column of m (resp., n) ones and the number C is such that
A+C > 0. The skew-symmetrix matrix M = −MT has size (m+n+1)× (m+n+1). (J.
von Neumann suggested another reduction resulting in a skew-symmetric matrix of size
(mn)× (mn) which is not so good from computational point of view.)
The bijection between the solutions (p, q, v) for the game with the matrix A and the
optimal strategies for the row player in the symmetric game with the matrix M is given
by
(p, q) 7→ (p, qT , v + C)/(2 + v + C).
Note that the last entry of any optimal strategy for the symmetric game above is
positive because A+ C > 0.
Now we start with any matrix game, with the payoff matrix M = −MT of size N by
N. (In the situation above, N = m+n+1.) Our problem is to find a column x = (xi) (an
optimal strategy) such that
Mx ≤ 0, x ≥ 0,
∑
xi = 1. (3)
This problem (3) (of finding an optimal strategy) is about finding a feasible solution
for a system of linear constraints. It can be written as the following linear program with
an additional variable t and the optimal value 0:
t→ min,Mx ≤ t, x ≥ 0,
∑
xi = 1. (4)
Now we find the largest entry c in the matrix M . If c = 0, then M = 0 and the
problem (1) is trivial (every mixed strategy x is optimal). So we assume that c > 0.
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Adding the number c to every entry of the matrix M, we obtain a matrix M + c ≥ 0
(all entries ≥ 0). The linear program (4) is equivalent to
t→ min, (M + c)x ≤ t, x ≥ 0,
∑
xi = 1 (5)
in the sense that these two programs have the same feasible solutions and the same optimal
solutions. The optimal value for (4) is 0 while the optimal value for (5) is c.
Now we can rewrite (5) as follows:
‖(M + c)x‖∞ → min, x ≥ 0,
∑
xi = 1 (6)
which is a Chebyshev approximation problem with additional linear constraints. We used
that M + c ≥ 0, hence (M + c)x ≥ 0 for every feasible solution x in (4). The optimal value
is still c.
Now we rid off the constraints in (4) as follows:
‖


(M + c)x
c− x∑
xi + c− 1
−
∑
xi − c+ 1

 ‖∞ → min . (7)
Note that the optimization problems (6) and (7) have the same optimal value c and
every optimal solution of (6) is optimal for (7). Conversely, for every x with a negative
entry, the objective function in (7) is > c. Also, for every x with
∑
xi 6= 1, the objective
function in (7) is > c. So every optimal solution for (5) is feasible and hence optimal for
(6).
Thus, we have reduced solving any symmetric matrix game with N ×N payoff matrix
to a Chebyshev approximation problem (7) with 2N + 2 affine functions in N variables.
Proof of Theorem 2
As in the proof of Theorem 1, we first reduce our game to a symmetric N by N game
where N = m + n + 1 and set c to be largest entry in the matrix M. The case c = 0 is
trivial, so let c > 0.
We want to find a column x such that
x ≥ 0,
∑
xi = 1,Mx ≤ 0.
Consider the l1 approximation problem whose objective function is f(x) =
‖


Mx
c+Mx
x
1− x
−1 +
∑
xi
1−
∑
xi


‖1 = ‖Mx‖1+‖c+Mx‖1+‖x‖1+‖1−x‖1+‖−1+
∑
xi‖1+‖1−
∑
xi‖1
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with 4N + 2 affine functions of N variables.
Note that f(x) = Nc + N for every optimal strategy x and that f(x) > Nc + N
for every x which is not an optimal strategy. So solving this approximation problem is
equivalent to solving the matrix game.
Remark. Our result implies that every l1 linear approximation problem can be
reduced to a l∞ linear approximation problem and vice versa..
There is an obvious direct reduction of the l1 approximation problem with the objec-
tive function (2) to
max |f1 ± f2 ± · · · ± fm| → min
which is a Chebyshev approximation problem with 2m−1 affine functions in n variables.
This reduction increases the size exponentially, while our reductions increases the size
linearly.
Remark. There are methods for solving l1 approximation problems alternative
to the simplex method [Bloomfield–Steiger 1983]. Our reductions allows us to use these
methods for solving arbitrary linear programs and matrix games.
Remark. A preprint with Theorem 1 appeared at arXiv [Vaserstein 2006].
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